

Italy and the Italians in the Political Geography of the Byzantines (14th Century)

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In the fourteenth century, the Byzantines were in close contact with the Italians, in a variety of political, commercial, and cultural contexts. What I should like to examine here is the place of Italy and the Italians in the political geography of the Byzantines: how much did the Byzantines know, and how much did they care about the area, its people, and its politics? Political geography, as I use the term, combines geography, ethnography, and political history; whether the Byzantines used such categories with regard to Italy and the Italians is part of the question.¹ The texts I will use are those of the three major narrative historians of the fourteenth century—George Pachymeres, John Cantacuzenus, and Nikephoros Gregoras—and it therefore should be clear that this is not a general inquiry into the topic but, rather, a historiographical one.

Of the three, Pachymeres is, in my view, by far the most interesting historian, followed by Gregoras. Pachymeres has a certain curiosity about peoples and their mores, especially evident in his discussion of the Cumans and the Mongols, where internal politics and international complexities are presented along with ethnographic observations, at a rather high level of sophistication. His geographic observations on Asia Minor and the Black Sea area are of impressive accuracy, especially when one looks at a Ptolemaic map, with which Pachymeres was undoubtedly acquainted. In comparison, where the Italian peninsula and the Italians are concerned, there is little geographic reference, and no ethnographic observations, except for a few clichés that are traditional in the Byzantine descriptions of westerners in general or Italians in particular: the mercenaries under the command of Michael VIII (the “Italian” foreign contingent) are called “the blond and bellicose race” (*τὸ ξανθόν τε καὶ ὀρμάνιον γένος*); to the contrary, the army of William of Achaia at the battle of Pelagonia, also called Italians, are qualified as “stupid, cowardly,

¹For the general issue, see my “On Political Geography: The Black Sea of Pachymeres,” in *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies Dedicated to Donald M. Nicol*, ed. R. Beaton and Ch. Roueché (London, 1993), 94–121. On Genoa, see S. Origone, “Genova vista da Bisanzio,” *La Storia dei Genovesi*, IX (1989), 485–505; and eadem, “Genova nel confronto con Bisanzio: Il giudizio degli storici bizantini (secoli XIV–XV),” in her *Bisanzio e Genova* (Genoa, 1992), 251–61. For a study of the Genoese view of Byzantium, see M. Balard, “Il mondo bizantino visto da Genova,” in *Europa e Mediterraneo tra medioevo e prima età moderna: l’osservatorio italiano*, ed. S. Gensini (Comune San Miniato, s.a.), 281–95.

and effeminate" (βλαξὶ καὶ τρυφεροῖς οὖσι)²—the former being more of a cliché than the latter. Not surprisingly, Pachymeres often refers to the superciliousness of the “Italians,” in a stock phrase known at least since the twelfth century, which Pachymeres favors, perhaps because the Greek is learned: he speaks of the κόροζα of the race (as had twelfth-century authors), whether in reference to the Italians in general or in relation to the Catalans.³ In fact, this cliché, called an “Italian” attribute, is the one most frequently used for westerners in general.

It is not peculiar that there should be an absence of ethnographic observations, for traditionally in Byzantine historiography (and perhaps in medieval historiography generally) ethnographic observations tend to be applied to nomadic peoples or peoples on the move—the “barbarians” par excellence—while settled peoples, especially those known from antiquity, are rarely described, time-honored characterizations being sufficient. Given this fact, our question becomes more focused on the political issue: that is, where do Pachymeres and the other historians place the Italians in their political universe? We come, then, to a second observation. Pachymeres almost never uses the term “Italy.”⁴ He sees neither Europe nor Italy as a monolithic unit, even in geographic terms. Instead, he sees the division of the peninsula into various political entities: he refers specifically to the maritime republics of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, to the marquisate of Montferrat, to the “kingdom of Apulia,” i.e., the Angevin kingdom of Naples, and to Sicily.⁵ He knows not only that there are different political entities, but also that there are political antagonisms between them, such as that between Venice and Genoa. Contrasted to this individuation of political entities is the use of the term “Italian” in a very general, indeed generic, way. This disjunction between the use of the term “Italy” and that of the word “Italians” is not repeated by the other fourteenth-century historians.

In Pachymeres’ history, the adjective “Italian” is used to describe a number of things: both specifically Italian affairs and people, and, more interestingly, westerners in general. In this second, generic use, it is the equivalent of the term “Latins,” more common in other sources but fairly rare in Pachymeres. Thus, counterintuitively for us, the members of the Fourth Crusade and the rulers of the Latin Empire of Constantinople are called “Italians.” Baldwin II of Courtenay is called the “emperor of the Italians”;⁶ when the city is retaken by the Byzantines, the palace is cleansed of the Italian soot (καπνοῦ καὶ λιγνός Ἰταλικῆς).⁷ Similarly, the princes and forces of the principality of Achaia are called Italians, at least for the most part; occasionally, the more common term “Latin” is used interchangeably with Italian.⁸ The plans of the houses of Anjou and Valois to recover Constantinople are described as the ambitions of “the Italians.”⁹ This generic use extends

²G. Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, ed. and trans. A. Failler, I (Paris, 1984), 79, 121 (hereafter Failler); see on this, H. Hunger, *Graeculus Perfidus ITALΟΣ ITAMΟΣ* (Rome, 1987).

³Failler, 219; G. Pachymeres, *De Michaeli et Andronico Palaeologis*, Bonn ed., 2 vols. (1835), II, 237 (hereafter Pachymeres, [Bonn]): the Venetians act with much “Italian arrogance” (Ιταλικῆς κορύζης καὶ φρύγματος); cf. II, 70. The Catalans are also said to have behaved with Italian κόρυζα: e.g., II, 572.

⁴For an exception, see Failler, 255: Michael Palaeologus sends embassies πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιδόξους τῆς Ἰταλίας.

⁵On Apulia, see Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 153, 202; Failler, 127, on Manfred, “king of Apulia.”

⁶Failler, 227.

⁷Failler, 219.

⁸Failler, 275, 421.

⁹Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 70.

to the Catalans, who are variously described as “Catalans,” “Almugavars,” and “Italians.”¹⁰ It cannot be that Pachymeres was unaware of their true provenance, for he seems to have known quite well the political events that brought the house of Aragon and the Spaniards to Sicily, where the Catalan company had fought before coming to the Byzantine Empire; he was simply using the term generically, to designate westerners. In the same way, he calls Roger de Flor both “Latin” and “Italian by race.”¹¹ Pachymeres knew something of Roger de Flor’s career—for example, that he had been a Templar in Acre before the fall of the city and then had fought for Frederick III of Sicily; so it is possible that he also knew that Roger’s father was a German, but that he considered the term “Italian” appropriate anyway.¹² Most curiously, perhaps, the army of Louis IX, on crusade in Tunis, is called both “Latins” and “Italians,” nicely contrasted to the “Hagarenes” and “Ethiopians.”¹³

Sometimes the term “Italian” is, indeed, used to designate Italians resident in the Byzantine Empire or ruling parts of the old empire. Thus, when describing Michael VIII’s actions after the capture of Constantinople, Pachymeres speaks of how the emperor treated the Latin φυλοί (races, national groups), and immediately afterwards tells us that Michael considered how he would persuade the notables of “the Italian races” (τῶν Ἰταλικῶν γενῶν) to come under his authority.¹⁴ Similarly, Crete is recognized as being under Venetian rule, which is sometimes called “the rule of the Italians” (Ιταλῶν ἐπικράτεια).¹⁵ In the case of Gregory III Kyprios, patriarch of Constantinople, his opponent John Bekkos called him “a man who had been born and raised among the Italians . . . and wore their clothes and spoke their tongue.”¹⁶ Given, however, the generic use of the term, it is not clear that in these instances the historian is using it in a specific (Italian) rather than a general (Western) sense.

Also generic is the use of the term to refer to the kingdom of Acre. It was the “Italians” who lived along the coasts of Syria “from old,” and it was from them that the Egyptians conquered the “great cities of the Italians,” i.e., Beirut, Sidon, Laodicea, Tripoli and Acre. Gregoras, who follows Pachymeres but also goes beyond him, correctly identifies the inhabitants of the crusader kingdom as descendants of French crusaders; so he understood well the meaning of Pachymeres’ “Italians,” although he himself did not use the term in this way. Interestingly enough, Pachymeres laments in a genuine voice the loss of the kingdom of Acre, which to some extent he ascribes to the policy of alliance of Michael VIII with the sultan Baybars.¹⁷ He says that of all those areas, the only one that remains is the state of the Armenians, and that the inhabitants of those “cities of the

¹⁰ For examples of the use of the term “Italian” for the Catalans, see Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 405, 421, 451–52, 608 ff, 632–34, etc.

¹¹ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 393, 521–22.

¹² On Roger de Flor, see A. E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 131.

¹³ Failler, 467.

¹⁴ Failler, 219. Are the “Italians” of Constantinople who welcomed Andronicus II after his two-year stay in Thessalonica only the merchants of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, or other westerners as well? Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 195, 291.

¹⁵ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 209, 241.

¹⁶ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 89; cf. Laiou, *Constantinople*, 35.

¹⁷ Failler, 241, 243; Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 86–87.

Italians" have been dispersed, except for those who died, either in war or as martyrs, refusing to become renegades. Clearly, he is speaking here of the great Christian community, and it does not matter to him that the inhabitants of the crusader states were not Orthodox but Catholic Christians. This is a striking and counterintuitive sentiment. Here the term "Italians" perhaps designates not only westerners, but also Catholic Christians generally.

This brings me to the other use of the term "Italian," to mean Catholic. Pachymeres has a vocabulary of religious designation that is somewhat unusual, though not unique, being shared, for example, with Akropolites. In it, the Byzantines are Romans, to be sure, but also "Graikoi," to be juxtaposed to "Italians." Thus, on January 5, 1282, at Vespers, a great mass was celebrated in the church of St. Sophia, newly cleansed to mark the end of the Unionist policy. Present on this occasion were both "Greeks [Γραικοί] and Italians." Some people, says Pachymeres, were astounded to see in the Great Church the Italians, holding candles, even though it was of *their* errors that the church had been cleansed only a short time ago.¹⁸ Clearly here "Italians" means Catholics, and Γραικοί means Orthodox; Pachymeres uses the term Γραικός only when he refers to ecclesiastical matters, and at one point he makes it clear that this term was the term used by the papal hierarchy—or the Italians—to designate the "Romans," i.e., the Byzantines; once again, in this passage the Graikoi are opposed to the Italians, i.e., the Orthodox to the Catholic.¹⁹ Elsewhere, the "Italians" are accused of heresy.²⁰ Sometimes, the term "Latin" is used for "Catholic," thus being interchangeable with "Italian."²¹ Surprisingly, too, the word "Roman," which normally means Byzantine, is sometimes used to designate an inhabitant of Rome, or even a Catholic, in a juxtaposition of Γραικός (Orthodox) and Ρωμαῖος (Catholic).²² Thus, the generic term "Italian" to mean westerner seems to derive from the equally generic, but differently charged use of the term to mean Catholic Christian. Here, undoubtedly, is the origin of the designation of all westerners, i.e., all adherents to the Church of Rome, as Italians.

The juxtaposition Γραικός—Ιταλός seems to go back to Akropolites' distinction of Ancient Greeks (Γραικοί) and Romans (Ιταλοί).²³ Herbert Hunger has already suggested that a minority of Byzantines argued that the Greeks and the Italians had originally been united, and shared much in common.²⁴ While the anti-Unionist Pachymeres never explicitly adopted this position, his use of terminology reflects such views as a subtext. Besides, Pachymeres sometimes speaks of a community of Christians, either in opposition to the Muslims or in terms of common adherence to the same God, therefore, deplored

¹⁸ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 22–23. "Italians" meaning Catholics: cf. II, 47, 109.

¹⁹ Failler, 461. Similarly, Failler, 481: Michael VIII argues that the Graikoi (Orthodox) and the Italians are very close in the great mysteries of the faith, and can commune with each other as easily as exchanging languages. Pachymeres claims that the Catholics considered the Graikoi to be "white Hagarenes": Failler, 471.

²⁰ Failler, 479, 481, 529–31.

²¹ Failler, 625.

²² For inhabitants of Rome, Failler, 55. Cf. Failler, 495: πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ρωμαίων ἐκκλησίαν=the Church of Rome; in the ceremony of the union of the two churches, the Gospels are read in Greek and Latin: Γραικικῶς τε ὁμοῦ καὶ Ρωμαϊκῶς: Failler, 511.

²³ G. Akropolites, *Opera*, ed. A. Heisenberg (Stuttgart, 1928), Κατὰ Λατίνων B, 64–65.

²⁴ Hunger, *Graeculus Perfidus ITALΟΣ ITAMΟΣ*, 44–45; cf. pp. 21, 33, 34, 37.

wars between Christians.²⁵ Pious and well-worn statements these undoubtedly were, but they appear to reflect something real as well. Pachymeres' overriding and overwhelming concern is with the fate of Asia Minor. All his other interests are subordinated to that and circumscribed by it. As far as westerners are concerned, one of the recurring themes is that they weakened the Byzantine Empire, both by the conquest of Constantinople and by their subsequent hostility, after 1261; this forced the Byzantines first to make alliances with the Turks, and secondly to divert resources from Asia Minor to the West, a combination of factors that facilitated Turkish expansion.²⁶ To this extent, then, he holds the westerners responsible for the fall of Asia Minor. But given his preoccupation, it also makes sense that the primary opposition in his mind is that not between Catholics and Orthodox Christians, but between Christians and Muslims. Opposed to church union he may have been, but this other conceptual framework is equally important, and has not been noticed sufficiently.

The term “Italian,” then, as used by Pachymeres, only rarely refers specifically to Italians, and then appears to be restricted to the citizens of the maritime cities. Let us now turn to the question of knowledge. What did Pachymeres know about Italy and the Italians, and what did he care to know? His knowledge of the geography of Italy can only be detected through his discussion of political events; it owes something to ancient geography and something to contemporary affairs. Thus, Venice is called both Aquileia (as it was on contemporary Ptolemaic maps) and Venice. The kingdom of Naples is called Apulia; Gregoras calls it Italy. The marquisate of Montferrat is, interestingly enough, placed in Lombardy or considered as part of Lombardy, both by Pachymeres and by Gregoras.²⁷ “Lombardy” is perhaps used, in a very broad sense, to mean northern Italy, as it was sometimes also used in contemporary Italian sources.²⁸ But placing Montferrat in Lombardy may be a political as well as a geographic statement: Pachymeres calls the marquis of Montferrat the “archon of Lombardy,” and indeed it is a fact that during the rule of Marquis William (d. 1292), Montferrat was an important power within the politics of Lombardy.²⁹ Still, in terms of geography, I note that Pachymeres accurately describes the route from Constantinople to Tunis (which he calls both Tunis and Carthage): from Avlona, past Pachino at the southeastern part of Sicily (*Πόλυνος ἄκρα*, as in a Ptolemaic map) and then through the Tyrrhenian Sea.³⁰

In terms of political geography, we find that Italian politics interests him only as it touches Byzantium, which occurs in rather specific ways. According to Pachymeres, the Italian political scene is dominated by the personality and politics of Charles of Anjou, and of course he is right. The papacy and the royal house of Aragon are important to the extent that they are connected with Charles of Anjou or with the matrimonial and

²⁵This occurs on at least two occasions: Michael VIII is said to have told some friars, soon after 1267, that the pope should not permit war between Christians, since “the Romans, whom they call Graikoi, are of the same Christ and the same church as the Italians” (Failler, 461, 463); Andronicus II is supposed to have sent a similar message to the Catalans: Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 566.

²⁶For example, Failler, 29 ff.

²⁷Theodore Palaeologus, going to Montferrat, is said to go to Lombardy: Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 87-88, 597-602.

²⁸See *Encyclopædia Italiana*, s.v. Lombardia.

²⁹See *Encyclopædia Italiana*, s.v. Montferrato; *Cambridge Medieval History*, VII, 23-24.

³⁰Failler, 465-67.

defensive plans of the Byzantines. The pivotal event, in his eyes, is the defeat of Manfred of Sicily by Charles of Anjou at the battle of Benevento, in 1266. The great struggles between papacy and empire, Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy, are telescoped in a statement about the hostility of German emperors toward the papacy, inherited from father to son.³¹ About Manfred, Pachymeres says that he had, as a sort of inheritance from his father (Frederick II), hostility toward the church (of Rome), and for that reason it was quite understandable that he should send German forces to fight against the "Italians" who held Constantinople. The occasion for this remark is the coalition between Michael II of Epirus, Manfred, and William II of Achaia against the forces of Nicaea, a coalition which came to an inglorious end at the battle of Pelagonia, in 1259. It is possible that each of these allies had in mind the conquest of Constantinople, which is the specific reference of Pachymeres' remark.³² Pachymeres knows, too, that it was the papacy that had called Charles of Anjou to Sicily, and he thinks the reason was that the Hohenstaufen wanted to rule Sicily independently of the papacy, which is fairly close to the truth.³³ With Manfred's defeat, we are told, Charles of Anjou, formerly a count, became king of Sicily, a reward he had been promised by the pope; he acquired the ambition of conquering Constantinople, as well as the arrogance with which Pachymeres credits him, built a fleet, and received the support of Clement IV for the conquest of Constantinople.³⁴ From then on, until Charles' death in 1285, Pachymeres' discussion of Italian politics is dominated by the interplay between Charles of Anjou, Michael VIII, the royal house of Aragon, and successive popes, whose policies he outlines fairly accurately although sketchily. A well-drawn scene has Charles of Anjou fuming at the arrival of Byzantine emissaries to the papal court of Gregory X, rolling at the feet of the pope, and gnawing on his scepter. The pope, however, says Pachymeres, defended the rights of the "Greeks," saying that Constantinople had been theirs before and belonged to them now.³⁵

If Italian politics during the reign of Michael VIII is dominated by Charles of Anjou and his plans, during the reign of Andronicus II the focus of interest is on Sicily, because of the connections of its king, Frederick III, with the Catalan mercenaries who were ravaging the empire. Indeed, virtually all mention of Sicily is in connection with the Catalan campaign, with only incidental information about other matters. That information, however, tends to be accurate. Thus, there is mention of the war in Sicily between Frederick III, correctly identified as Frederick II's grandson (through Frederick II's mother Constance, Manfred's daughter), and Charles of Valois, who had come to the aid of the Angevins of Naples. Frederick III, says Pachymeres, opposed the church almost by family tradition. There is then an allusion to the peace of Caltabelotta, the marriage of Charles of Valois to Catherine of Courtenay (Pachymeres calls her, correctly, Baldwin's granddaughter), through whom he acquired claims on Constantinople, and his "corona-

³¹Other major Italian affairs, such as the civil troubles in Florence in the early years of the 14th century, are not mentioned.

³²Failler, 117–18; cf. D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Paleologus and the West, 1258–1282* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 47 ff.

³³Failler, 249.

³⁴Failler, 411, 461, 641; N. Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, Bonn ed., 3 vols. (1829–55), I, 123 (hereafter Gregoras), for Charles' ambitions.

³⁵Failler, 523; M.-H. Laurent, *Le bienheureux Innocent V et son temps*, ST 129 (Vatican City, 1947).

tion” by the pope as “δίχα τέρας, εἴτ’ οὖν γῆς, . . . κράτορα.”³⁶ Thus, it appears that Pachymeres was quite well informed about the intricacies of European, or at least Italian, politics and marriage alliances, but he rarely reports them except when they touch directly on Byzantium. He also seems to know something about Western feudal customs, since he reports Berengar d’ Entença’s oath of hommage to Andronicus II, saving his liege hommage to his king, Frederick III.³⁷

Insofar as the internal politics of Italian powers are concerned, Pachymeres knows something about the political structure of Venice and Genoa, namely, about communal government. He uses the word κοινὸν συνέδριον for the Venetian Senate, and συνέδριον for the Genoese councils or commune.³⁸ He knows that the political structure of the Genoese colonies was patterned on that of Genoa,³⁹ and that all the Genoese colonies cooperated.⁴⁰ He knows, too, that the *abbate del popolo* of Pera was appointed from Genoa, and was, in name and originally in function, the equivalent of the Roman *tribunus plebis*, which he rendered as προτίτωρ τοῦ δῆμου.⁴¹ He knows at least the name of Spinola (Opizzino Spinola), one of the two captains of the people of Genoa, whose daughter had married Theodore, son of Adronicus II and marquis of Montferrat.⁴² For the rest, he is not concerned with the internal politics of these two states, or, even less so, of Pisa. What he is quite knowledgeable about, and in a rather sophisticated manner, is Genoese commercial policy in the old Byzantine Empire and the Black Sea area. He details the beginnings of Genoese predominance in the Black Sea—based partly on imperial privileges, partly on the fact that they navigated even in winter. He gives an intelligent account of the problems of Alexius III of Trebizond and the Genoese, who wanted relief from the *kommerkion*,⁴³ but then, he was generally very interested and very well informed about the Black Sea area. He is equally well informed about the Zaccaria monopoly of the alum mines of Phocaea and their effort to entirely corner the market by having Michael VIII forbid the export of Asia Minor alum by their compatriots; nor is he ignorant of the objections of the other Genoese to this imperial policy.⁴⁴ Generally speaking, he shows quite a remarkable understanding of the means through which the Italian cities, but especially Genoa, estab-

³⁶ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 394. Cf. Laiou, *Constantinople*, 129 ff.

³⁷ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 499.

³⁸ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 243: Planoudes speaks to the Venetian Senate. Other Byzantine sources of the period call the Venetian Senate βουλή: F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi* (Venice, 1865), III, 86 (1277). The Venetian state is rendered, in the treaties, as the περιφανὲς κοινούνιον καὶ ὄλοτης Βενετίας or ἐπιφανῆ δούκα καὶ κοινούνιον Βενετίας, a translation of “illustris ducis et communis Veneciarum”: see Miklosich and Müller, *Acta*, III, 84, 100, and G. M. Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum* (New York, 1966), I, 82, 200 ff. The word “συνέδριον,” when applied to Genoa, may refer to the communal government, that is, it may be equivalent to “commune.” Cf. *Liber Jurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, ed. H. Ricottius, in *Monumenta Historiae Patriae* (Turin, 1872), I, no. 945 (ambaxatores communis Janue); col. 1356: dominus Guigilimus Bucanigra communis et populi ianuensis capitaneus et consilium magnum.

³⁹ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 495, 624: ἐκ τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ κοινῶν συνεδρίων τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν.

⁴⁰ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 243, 624.

⁴¹ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 624. See also W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* (Leipzig, 1936), I, 458, who says that the reference is to the first *abbate del popolo* of Pera and notes that Pachymeres has a remarkably clear knowledge of the office.

⁴² Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 598. On the other hand, Pachymeres does not refer to the internal politics of Genoa at the time of Guglielmo Boccanegra, an important period for Byzantium.

⁴³ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 448–50.

⁴⁴ Failler, 535 ff. Cf. M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1978), II, 776 ff.

lished their supremacy, even as he regrets the deleterious effects on the Byzantine economy.

Pachymeres' attitude toward the Italians is conditioned by a few important factors. The most fundamental one is the fact that for him, Nicaean born and bred, the heart and kernel of the empire lay in the East. It is the loss of Asia Minor that he laments, and for this he holds the Italians partly responsible. Their conquest of Constantinople in 1204, and the subsequent "thalassocracy" which they established, forced the Byzantines to divert resources for the defense of the littoral and did not allow them to stem the Turkish advance, as they could have done; in order to fight against the Italians, they had to make opportunistic alliances with the Cumans and the Turks.⁴⁵ The Italians here, are generally the Catholics, but specifically and historically the Venetians and the Genoese. This comes at the very beginning of his *History*, and sets the tone. The same theme is carried through in the discussion of the plans of the Angevins or of successive popes for the recovery of Constantinople. It carries over, for example, in his frequently raised objections to the destruction of the Byzantine fleet after 1285; the fleet was needed primarily against westerners, and it was no longer there. On the other hand, there is no question that Pachymeres considers that there is a community of Christians, to which both the Catholics and the Orthodox belong, although the former are misguided. To what has been said above on this subject, one may add the remark that references to Italian states, Sicily, the Venetians, and the Genoese have a strangely familiar feel about them—as though these are areas and people with whom one is quite well acquainted. They are, of course, clearly and unambiguously, "other": the immediate world of Pachymeres consists of the East (Asia Minor) and the West (lands west of Constantinople, primarily Epirus). Italy does not at all appear within these geographic parameters. Pachymeres was a realist. At one point he has Michael VIII say that in the old days, before 1204, the frontiers of the empire extended from the Tigris and the Euphrates to Sicily and Apulia, and from Egypt to the arctic regions; we know of course that the rhetoric of the Palaeologan period is the rhetoric of ecumenicism.⁴⁶ But Pachymeres, both overtly and in his signifiers, never has such claims. So for him, the Italians, both *qua* Italians and *qua* Catholic, are foreign, but a very familiar foreigner who might have been a brother.

The two other major historians of the fourteenth century, John Cantacuzenus and Nikephoros Gregoras, have a certain amount in common, but also considerable differences.⁴⁷ What they share in the first instance is certain blunt, concrete, and unsubtle realities: for one thing, they both had first-hand experience of the great civil war, although for Cantacuzenus the stakes were much higher than for Gregoras, and the experience had quite a different effect on each of them. Also, they lived in a world that they both realized had much shrunk for the Byzantines. There is no reason to dwell on obvious facts here, for example, on the fact that a very considerable part of the old Byzantine Empire was still, or newly, in the hands of westerners—the Peloponnese, Rhodes, the islands of the Aegean and the Ionian Seas, Crete, and Cyprus, not to mention Pera. I

⁴⁵ Failler, 27, 29.

⁴⁶ Failler, 209.

⁴⁷ Pachymeres' history stops in 1308; Cantacuzenus covers the years 1320 to 1356, and Gregoras the period 1204 to 1359. For Gregoras' dependence on Pachymeres, see R. Guillard, *Essai sur Nicéphore Grégoras: l'homme et l'œuvre* (Paris, 1926).

may be allowed to posit as a fact, without having to prove it, that educated Byzantines of the fourteenth century, or indeed any Byzantines of any period, were not *ipso facto* stupid; I will add that much as they may have wished to conceal reality, some aspects of it were hard to conceal even from themselves. Thus, both Gregoras and Cantacuzenus, from different viewpoints to be sure, were perfectly aware that they lived in a world where the actions of outsiders—Serbs, Bulgarians, Turks, and even Italians—could spell life and death. The question here is how specifically they dealt with this reality, in particular with regard to Italy and the Italians.

It is not surprising that both historians, writing in the middle of the fourteenth century, after decades of intensive contact, should be quite familiar with westerners in general and with Italians in particular. The marriages of Palaeologan emperors with Western princesses had played a role complementary to that of the presence of Western merchants. Each of these ladies—Irene of Montferrat, Adelheid (Irene) of Brunswick-Grubenhagen, and Anne of Savoy, especially the latter—had brought with them large retinues, and the Byzantines at the court had become well accustomed to Western, and Italian, mores, Italian dress, and Western forms of entertainment. Both Gregoras and Cantacuzenus mention the jousts and tournaments in which Andronicus III and his compatriots indulged and in which, says Cantacuzenus, he proved himself better than the Savoyards, the French, the Germans, and the Burgundians who were the experts in such things. Gregoras gives definitions and long descriptions of jousts and tournaments, differentiating between the two.⁴⁸ Contact with people from these retinues, with ambassadors who almost routinely traveled back and forth from Italy to negotiate church union or political and matrimonial alliances, and with the Franciscans and Dominicans of Constantinople had made Italy and the Italians a very familiar part of the social as well as the political landscape. Cantacuzenus in particular moved in circles that included highly placed Western aristocrats and important people among the Genoese of Pera; he spoke some kind of “Latin” language, presumably an Italian dialect.⁴⁹ Some of the individuals who came to the Byzantine Empire with the Western princesses played an important role in subsequent political developments, and Cantacuzenus was in close contact with them too; a case in point is Zampea (Isabeau) and her son Artotos (Odoardo?) from the retinue of Anne of Savoy, whose adventures in Byzantium and Italy would repay a little study.⁵⁰ Gregoras, too, had his own contacts with Italians. Given this background, let us see what place Italy and the Italians occupied in their worldview.

First, let us turn to some questions of terminology. Both Gregoras and Cantacuzenus revert to the term “Latin” as a generic designation of westerners, including Italians; the

⁴⁸ J. Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum*, Bonn ed., 3 vols. (1828–32), I, 204–5 (hereafter Cantacuzenus); Gregoras, I, 481–83.

⁴⁹ Cantacuzenus, III, 303. One of his friends, “Ntziuan de Spinia” (Giovanni Spinola), who was “glorious among the Latins,” also knew Greek: I, 484. Andronicus III had among his confidants three Genoese of noble family from Pera—Raffo Doria, Raffo de Mari, and Federico Spinola: I, 39. On the activities of the Franciscans, see M. Roncaglia, *Les frères mineurs et l'église grecque orthodoxe au XIII^e siècle (1231–1274)* (Cairo, 1954); D. Geanakoplos, “Bonaventura, the Two Mendicant Orders and the Greeks at the Council of Lyons (1274),” *The Orthodox Church and the West* (Oxford, 1975), 183–211. On the Dominicans, see M. H. Gourdeau, “Frère Simon le Constantinopolitain, O.P. (1235?–1325?),” *REB* 45 (1987), 165–81.

⁵⁰ Cantacuzenus, I, 205; II, 123, 126, etc. Cf. D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100–1460* (Washington, D.C., 1968), 47.

term “Italian” has the restricted meaning of an inhabitant of the Italian peninsula or some part thereof. The Western rulers of Constantinople, whom Pachymeres called “Italian,” are here called “Latin.”⁵¹ The same people, for example the rulers of Euboea, are sometimes called Latins and sometimes designated more specifically as Venetians or Genoese; indeed, the Genoese inhabitants of Pera are often called the “Latins of Galata.”⁵² Along with the generic descriptions, we have the differentiation of westerners and their lands: France, Burgundy, Savoy, Montferrat, Spain, England, and “Germany” all are specifically mentioned. As far as the Italian peninsula is concerned, there is quite close differentiation, as we shall see. Italy is part of a broader Western world, the most important part for the fourteenth-century Byzantines, and it is as part of that broader world that its role is best understood.

The world of Cantacuzenus and Gregoras has shifted west in a significant way in comparison to Pachymeres. Let us first have a look at the world as they knew it, i.e., the places they mention. Cantacuzenus’ world includes the coasts of Asia Minor, the Byzantine possessions of the Balkans, the possessions of the various Western powers in the former Byzantine lands; the areas inhabited or ruled by Albanians, Serbs, and Bulgarians; to the north, there is Caffa and Tana, to which he devotes a certain amount of attention in connection with the War of the Straits that started in September 1350; in the same connection he mentions the Mongols of the Golden Horde.⁵³ Moving west, we find a proliferation of specificities: there is mention of Germany or Germans, France, Aragon, Burgundy, and Humbert II, dauphin of Viennois.⁵⁴ In Italy, he mentions Venice, Genoa, Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, Montferrat, Savoy, Taranto, Calabria, and Lombardy.⁵⁵ Egypt and Syria, which had been integral parts of Pachymeres’ world, and, by imitation, also of that of Gregoras, appear once, with Cantacuzenus’ embassy to Sultan al-Nasir al-Hasan to seek protection or favors for the Christians, and, primarily it seems, to place Lazaros on the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem.⁵⁶ Cantacuzenus’ *oikoumene* can be reconstructed from his description of the areas struck by the great plague of 1347: the lands of the “Scythians” (here, Mongols), the Black Sea, Thrace, Macedonia, Greece, Italy, “all of the islands,” Egypt, Libya, Judaea, and Syria, “and [it] virtually (invaded) the entire

⁵¹ Gregoras, I, 17, 81 ff, 85–86; Cantacuzenus, I, 520–21, 173–74.

⁵² See, for example, Gregoras, I, 117, 95, and Cantacuzenus, III, 211 ff. The equivalent of Pachymeres’ Ἰταλικὴ κόρυζα is Λατινικὴ ὄφρυς. Cf. Gregoras, I, 96, 447; II, 834.

⁵³ Cantacuzenus, III, 192 ff. On this, see C. P. Kyrris, “John Cantacuzenus, the Genoese, the Venetians and the Catalans (1348–1354),” *Byzantina* 4 (1972), 331–56; M. Balard, “A propos de la bataille du Bosphore: l’expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople (1351–1352),” *TM* 4 (1970), 431–69.

⁵⁴ For the dauphin of Viennois, see Cantacuzenus, III, 13 ff; The form of the name (Δελφίνου Ντεβιόνα, Ἰνιμπέρτω Δελφίνῳ Ντεβιάνα) might suggest that Cantacuzenus uses “Dauphin de Viennois” as a name rather than a title; there is also similar usage of “marquis” in the reference to the marquis of Montferrat (III, 12); I think he is perfectly aware of the realities, but uses the title simply as a referent to the person in question, which is why it looks like a name. Interestingly, it is the form used by G. Stella, RISS 17:1088 (147): Ingibertus Delfinus Vienne. On the dauphin, see K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)* (Philadelphia, 1976), I, 205 ff.

⁵⁵ Cantacuzenus, II, 508–10; I, 256, 510. The “princess of Taranto” is his usual way of referring to Joanna I of Naples.

⁵⁶ Cantacuzenus, III, 90 ff. Included here is a very interesting “letter” of the sultan, written in a sort of demotic Greek similar to that used later in Ottoman documents.

oikoumene in a circle.”⁵⁷ This is a medieval world: certainly the Hyperborean Scythians belong to the world of antiquity, but the marquis of Montferrat (otherwise described as “Markesis o Loumpardias archon”),⁵⁸ the count of Savoy, the dauphin de Viennois, “Frantza,” and “Burgunia” place us firmly in the fourteenth century.

Cantacuzenus’ world looks large, but in fact it is not. He may know perfectly well that places, states, and peoples, even outside the ones he mentions, exist, but he is not very interested in them; indeed, the areas he is interested in have shrunk since the time of Pachymeres. His focus is upon Constantinople, the southern Balkan states—Serbia and Bulgaria—the Peloponnese, the islands of the Aegean, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The interior of Asia Minor, lost to the Byzantines, is not of interest to him, nor are the Mongols, except as their actions on the coast, especially the coast of the Crimea and the Sea of Azov, touch upon the affairs of the Mediterranean powers, Venice and Genoa, and tangentially upon Byzantium. He neither knows nor cares (or perhaps he knows but does not care) about the internal affairs of the Mongols, as Pachymeres had. Furthermore, his historical work is one long *apologia* for the great civil war: all of Book Three is dedicated to it, and Book Four, a considerable part of which relates to conflicts with and between westerners (primarily the Venetians and the Genoese), is also concerned with the continuation of the civil war. Nor is this simply a statistical matter—how many words are dedicated to the civil war; it is, rather, a conceptual matter, since his view of the world is highly colored by his own concerns about class, aristocratic privilege, contempt of the plebs, and his need to justify his actions during the civil war.

So it is with Cantacuzenus’ approach to Italy and the Italians. The term “Italy” as used by him is a geographic term to designate the entire peninsula. Thus, he talks of the dynasts (the rulers) of Italy to refer to those whom Clement VI approached (in fact or in fiction) for a crusade; he mentions that he feared lest the expedition being prepared by the pope and “those of Italy and the rest of the West” be sent against him.⁵⁹ In 1347 he speaks of a great war all over Italy (*κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν*), whose kings would move one against the other and which put an end to the plans of Clement VI for a crusade. The references to war may have to do with the Cola di Rienzo affair in Rome or with the activities of Giovanni Visconti or with the conflict between the three branches of the house of Savoy.⁶⁰ He gives no geographic information about Italy, just as he gives no geographic or anthropological information on any area or people outside his immediate focus of interest. What interests him about Italy can be summarized under three headings: the opinion of important Italians (particularly the Genoese, whether of Pera or of Genoa), as well as of the pope, regarding himself and his role in the civil war; the politics of Italian powers with regard to the Byzantine Empire, which in fact took place primarily in the years of the civil war and its immediate aftermath; and the internal politics of some

⁵⁷ Cantacuzenus, III, 49. Cf. similarly Gregoras, III, 797–98, who takes us to the Strait of Gibraltar, and who insists on the fact that the plague struck only the coastal lands.

⁵⁸ Cantacuzenus, III, 12.

⁵⁹ Cantacuzenus, III, 54, 56. Similarly, another envoy, from Savoy, will return “to Italy”: II, 510. Cantacuzenus is either ignorant or careless about the seat of the papacy at this time. He talks about the return of the ambassadors of Clement VI to Italy, although the papacy was, at the time, in Avignon.

⁶⁰ Cantacuzenus, III, 62.

Italian states, primarily Genoa, which he understood in ways similar to the way he understood the Byzantine civil war. A fourth point of considerable interest, namely, the see-saw between Byzantines and Genoese with regard to the islands and cities of the northern Aegean, i.e., Chios, Lesbos, Phocaea, is tangential to our topic, and I will not deal with it.

The Italian areas or states that are mentioned by Cantacuzenus are the papacy, as a political and religious power (but there is no mention of the papal states), Venice, Genoa, Sardinia, Milan, Montferrat, Savoy, the kingdom of Naples.⁶¹ One focal point of Cantacuzenus' interest, in my view, lies in his desire to persuade the Italians and other westerners (as well as the reader) that he was more sinned against than sinning in the civil war. He mentions several embassies going back and forth between Pera and himself and between Constantinople and the papacy, all eventually declaring him innocent. The people he was trying to persuade were the Genoese of Pera (and eventually of Italy), Savoy, the Avignonese papacy, and the dauphin of Viennois. The first embassy, in 1345, consisted of a man named Henry, who was a Franciscan from Savoy, and another, unnamed, Franciscan; both of them were sent to Cantacuzenus by the Genoese of Pera to inquire about the causes of the war, or so Cantacuzenus tells us. Cantacuzenus persuades them that he was in the right, and they promise to bring the news to both Italy and Constantinople/Pera.⁶² The second embassy was actually sent by the dauphin of Viennois to Anne of Savoy, but reached Constantinople after the end of the civil war, to find Cantacuzenus on the throne. The ambassador, a certain Bartholomew, then wrote letters to both the pope and the dauphin in which he extolled Cantacuzenus in fulsome terms, or so Cantacuzenus reports. A few sentences will give the flavor of these letters. To the pope, he is supposed to have written, "Let the entire people under Roman rule exalt, let the entire world rejoice in the victory of such an Emperor. On the third of February [1347], a day dawned that is holy among all Christians, on which the Lord send His angel to prepare the way before Him, and with His splendid light to send far away the darkness of battle, bringing peace like an olive branch. For this is the King of peace, the second Solomon, whose countenance is desired by the entire creation . . ." To the dauphin, he wrote, "Let the entire faithful people rejoice: let the Christians sing hymns; let the glorious feast days renew themselves in the splendid temples . . ." Cantacuzenus is described as more philanthropic than Augustus, more pious than Theodosius (I), more equitable and good than Scipio, "who subjugated Africa to our Italians." "Now," the ambassador says, "I am hopeful that his reign will bring peace among the Christians and will repel the Ismaelites."⁶³

There were, of course, good political reasons for this interest of Cantacuzenus in persuading various Western powers of his probity: Pope Clement VI (1342–52) was one of the popes who had the crusade very much at heart, and the crusade of Smyrna was a recent event, of which Cantacuzenus was very much aware;⁶⁴ he was also fearful that,

⁶¹For some reason, the kingdom of Naples has the most variegated designations in the 14th century: Pachymeres calls it "Apulia," Cantacuzenus "Taranto," and Gregoras "Italy."

⁶²Cantacuzenus, II, 502 ff.

⁶³Cantacuzenus, III, 12 ff (1347).

⁶⁴On the crusade of Smyrna, see Cantacuzenus, II, 422–23, 529, 582–83. Cf. Setton, *Papacy and the Levant*, I, 182 ff.

with the wrong public relations, another crusade might well be directed against him. Furthermore, it appears that the marquis of Montferrat was collecting forces to claim the Byzantine throne, as protector perhaps of John V, his nephew, and he had, it seems, the support of the papacy and of some Italian rulers. Cantacuzenus was to claim that the fact that he persuaded the pope of his own good conduct brought these ambitions to an end. Most of all, Cantacuzenus was sensitive to the charge that he had brought the Turks into Europe, a charge of which he tried strenuously to clear himself. Given the political climate, and the interests of Clement VI, he might well fear that such a charge would make him not only morally culpable but also easy prey to any westerner, Genoese or crusader, who could claim to act in the interest of Christendom.

Beyond these political and practical considerations, however, one is struck by the fact that for Cantacuzenus the papacy as well as the westerners and the Italians, collectively and separately, function as arbiters of the legitimacy of his claims—as a sort of international public opinion to which he appeals and which he tries to sway. This is a very different matter from Pachymeres' view of a community of Christians with common interests. Pachymeres talks of the economic superiority and the political arrogance of the Italians—primarily the Genoese—but not of any control they had over the affairs of the empire. For Cantacuzenus, the civil war ended with the empire in thrall to the westerners, on whose good will and good opinion he felt he depended. This is different, too, from the dependence the empire had developed on the Turks and the Serbs, with whom it made alliances and fought battles. Cantacuzenus does not seem opposed to this dependence on the Italians, which is not an entirely tangible one. Certainly their hostility could have had disastrous effects for him, but he also saw them as one important set of powers who had an interest in the Byzantine Empire because of imperial intermarriages, because of commercial interests, and, finally, because the presence of the Turks in Europe touched both their religious sensibilities and their political life. Historians generally note that the civil war brought the Serbs and the Turks into prominence and made them the arbiters of the fate of the Byzantine Empire: this dependence on the Italians (as well as on the papacy), no less clear, has been less noticed.

The second theme of Cantacuzenus—the policy of various Italian powers with regard to Byzantium—has already been partly treated in the discussion of the Italians as a forum of international opinion. It may be observed in a general way, that whereas Cantacuzenus treats in some detail the politics of the Venetians and the Genoese in various parts of the Byzantine Empire—Pera, Chios, Lesbos, Phocaea, etc.—his treatment of the policies of the Italian states themselves is shallow. He mentions, for example, the Venetian efforts to forge an alliance with him against the Genoese in the course of the War of the Straits, but his frame of reference is simply the Venetian-Genoese rivalry.⁶⁵ Genoese policy in the Levant is simply and briefly interpreted as a desire for the mastery of the seas, without the lengthier and quite circumstantial discussion provided by Gregoras.⁶⁶ This shallowness remains true of his discussion of Western politics generally. The reader of Cantacuzenus, for example, receives no explanation of the Aragonese alliance with Venice at the time of the War of the Straits, whereas the reader of Gregoras does.

⁶⁵ Cantacuzenus, III, 185 ff.

⁶⁶ Cantacuzenus, III, 68 ff, 185 ff.

This shallowness results in part from Cantacuzenus' lack of interest, and partly from his concept of politics, which seems to center primarily on the actions of individuals, especially members of the aristocracy. I have already mentioned the fact that he is as conscious of rank among the Italians and the westerners in general as he is among the Byzantines. Occasionally, he bestows higher rank to the former, because it suits his purpose in terms of his Byzantine interests. Thus, the duke of Brunswick-Grubenhagen is called ἐπιφανέστατος because his daughter married Andronicus III.⁶⁷ Andronicus III's German mercenaries are aristocrats, as are the Genoese ambassadors sent to John VI in 1347 to discuss the question of Chios.⁶⁸ Andronicus' three Genoese friends, who were told of his intention to rebel, are called not noble but powerful among the Genoese of Galata; Cantacuzenus' way of giving their names makes it clear that they were, in fact, of noble lineage: "Their names were, from the family of Oria, Raffo d'Oria; from the Spinula, Frerigo Spinula; from that of Demar, Raffo Demar."⁶⁹ Indeed, these three families had a very weighty presence in Pera; it has been estimated that of thirty *podestàs* of Pera, from 1264 to 1348, seventeen belonged to them.⁷⁰ His interest in internal Italian politics forms part of the same conceptualization. He knows that there are different forms of government in Italy, and mentions, for example, the count of Savoy, the marquis "of Lombardy" (Montferrat), and the princess of Taranto. Venice, he knows, is governed by the doge and the Senate (δούξ, βουλή).⁷¹ Genoa he calls, quite properly, a "commune" (τὸ κοινόν Γεννούας), and refers to decisions of the Senate and the people of Genoa, or of the doge and the people (δούξ, βουλή, δῆμος), and to ambassadors sent to the doge, the Senate, and the people of Genoa to negotiate the return of Chios to the Byzantines.⁷² He also knows something about the mahona of Chios, namely, that it was a group of private individuals, aristocrats who had financed and armed their own fleet and taken the island, even though he does not dispute, as perhaps he should have done, the Genoese government's disclaimer of any responsibility for the affair.⁷³

The civil wars in Italy, especially in Genoa, Cantacuzenus knew about, and presented in a way fully consonant with his views of who should rule and how. He mentions the revolution of 1339 in terms redolent of the Byzantine civil war, as he saw it.⁷⁴ The people of Genoa, he said, rose against their aristocracy, exiling some, forbidding others to partic-

⁶⁷ Cantacuzenus, I, 52.

⁶⁸ Cantacuzenus, I, 98; III, 81–82. Some noble Latins are knighted: II, 166.

⁶⁹ Cantacuzenus, I, 39. This is also the way such names appear in the Genoese annals: illi de Auria, illi de Spinolis, illi de Flisco, illi de Grimaldis. See T. O. de Negri, *Storia di Genova* (Florence, 1986), 397. Cf. Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 252. Cantacuzenus also had a great and old friend, Giovanni Spinola: Cantacuzenus, I, 482. Cf. Gregoras, I, 233, 237, who says that (Opizzino) Spinola, whose daughter married Theodore of Montferrat, was of low rank since westerners will not allow nobles to marry even imperial Byzantine offspring.

⁷⁰ Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 213–14; she also notes that after the middle of the 14th century only eight of these names belong to the Doria and the Spinola.

⁷¹ Cantacuzenus, III, 219 ff: ὁ, τε γὰρ Βενετίας δούξ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ τῶν ιδίων ἀνέθηκαν ἐκείνῳ (N. Pisano) τὴν ἀρχὴν.

⁷² Cantacuzenus, I, 489, 492, 486; III, 234 ff. The response also comes in the name of the doge, the commune, and the people of Genoa: III, 81.

⁷³ Cantacuzenus, III, 81: οἰκείοις ἀναλόμαστι. Cf. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, 173 ff, on Simone Vignoso and the mahona.

⁷⁴ On what follows, see also Stella, RISS, 129 ff.

ipate in the government, “and humiliating them in every way.” They chose instead “someone called Simone Boccanegra,” from among the people, and made him their ruler (ἀρχῶν).⁷⁵ Then came the Venetian war, declared in 1350. The Genoese saw that the war needed a lot of money, so they recalled the exiled nobles and asked them to help govern. The nobles behaved responsibly and magnanimously, thinking it better to give their help than for the entire commune to be defeated and humiliated. So they berated the people for their poor judgment and ingratitude in “that they behaved shamefully (προπλακίζοντι) to the best people, having nothing to accuse them of, except that they were better than they,” but did then participate eagerly in the war. The result was the appointment of Pagano Doria, “the most illustrious of the lineage of the Doria,” as admiral.⁷⁶ Later, Pagano Doria was accused by Boccanegra and the people of having been responsible for the defeat, and replaced. This led to greater defeat at the battle of Alghero (off Sardinia), and to the subjugation of Genoa to Giovanni Visconti of Milan (1353): “thus the Genoese were forced by the war to take ignoble actions against their own liberty, and, abandoning their earlier arrogance, and deposing their archon, Simone Boccanegra, they received as archon (doge) of the city the man appointed by the ruler of Milan.”⁷⁷

All of this is simply the plight of the aristocracy as understood and related by Cantacuzenus. It is one more case that proves his point, for in Byzantium too, according to him, the best people had been taken out of government by Alexios Apokaukos and the Zealots; it was for that reason, he tells us elsewhere in his *History*, that the state could find no one with the wherewithal, the spirit, the courage, and the expertise to defend it. He considered himself among those who had been ill-treated yet always worked for the common good; the reported sentiments of the nobles of Genoa are very much what he relates about himself, when, at about the same time, he accused the merchants of Constantinople of not having given him money to build a fleet against the Genoese, but nevertheless forgave them. Genoese politics comes to confirm, once again, Cantacuzenus’ position during the civil war.⁷⁸ It does so because he twists and manipulates Genoese history and, given his detailed knowledge of it, he alters it consciously. His discussion of the first stages of Boccanegra’s accession is, generally speaking, accurate. It is true that in 1339 all nobles were excluded from the Consiglio and the government generally, and that the Guelphs and some of the Ghibellines were exiled or left Genoa temporarily. For the rest, Simone Boccanegra, the merchant who challenged the rule of noble families, is made responsible for all the evils that befell the city, much as Alexios Apokaukos was made responsible for all the evils of the Byzantine civil war. To this purpose, Cantacuzenus extends the first “dogado” of Boccanegra to cover the period 1339 to 1353 continuously. Yet, we know that the Genoese war with Venice had not yet begun (1350) when Boccanegra was forced to abdicate by the very nobles he had admitted back into the Council of Twelve (on 23 December 1344). It was surely not the merchant Boccanegra but the noble Giovanni di

⁷⁵ Boccanegra was, indeed, named *signore* and *duca*.

⁷⁶ Cantacuzenus, III, 197–98. Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, quite rightly points out Cantacuzenus’ admiration for his foremost enemy in the War of the Straits.

⁷⁷ Cantacuzenus, III, 234–35. On the battle of Alghero, see Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, 109–10; and T. N. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Oxford, 1991).

⁷⁸ Cf. Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 253.

Valente who was responsible for Pagano Doria's replacement by Antonio Grimaldi, another member of the nobility, and also responsible for the surrender of the city to Milan.⁷⁹ Both in this abuse of Genoese history and in his own efforts to persuade the Italians that he was in the right, Cantacuzenus makes Italy function as an extension of Byzantium, not necessarily because such was the reality, but because of his own need for justification, and also, because by then Italian and Byzantine affairs were closely intertwined.

Gregoras' concerns being different from those of Cantacuzenus, his approach to Italy and Italian affairs or matters connected with them is also somewhat different. In Gregoras' *History* the civil war of John VI and the regency for John V occupies a central place, but for reasons other than those behind Cantacuzenus' narrative: he was detailing the decline of the Byzantine Empire, in which the civil war was instrumental, and he was, of course, deeply embroiled in the Palamist controversy, to which he devotes a very considerable proportion of his work. At the same time, he is a successor of Pachymeres in a variety of ways. Primary for us is the fact that he has a much broader view of the world than does Cantacuzenus, and also a great deal more curiosity, which makes him take shorter or longer excursions into geography, the description of political affairs and mores, and even ethnographic descriptions.

The affairs of Byzantium take place in a world that is larger, more variegated, and better known to the author than that of Cantacuzenus. It includes the coasts of Asia Minor (though not the interior, which had not been discussed since the time of Pachymeres), Syria, and Palestine, where the fall of the crusader states (the states of the Keltogalatai as he calls them) in 1291 is recorded, following Pachymeres.⁸⁰ Egypt is very much present, and its expansion westward into north Africa (Morocco and Libya) in the late thirteenth century is mentioned. The travels of Agathangelos to the Christian lands of the East cause Gregoras to mention Egypt, Phoenicia, Syria, Arabia, Cyprus, Crete, and Euboea.⁸¹ Tana, Caffa, the Crimea, the Sea of Azov, the Mongols of Nogai and the Golden Horde appear several times, as does Trebizond.⁸² Rus and Lithuania are mentioned at surprising length for reasons mostly connected with ecclesiastical matters. About the Russians, he says that they border the western ocean and the Hyperborean Scythians, and he is much impressed by the size and the wealth of their land. He knows about the Mongol invasions, and the translation of the see of the metropolitan of Kiev to Vladimir and about the rivalry of Moscow and the Lithuanians.⁸³ Finally, there is mention of Germany, and he knows something about England and France and the beginnings of the Hundred Years War (1338, though the passage, close chronologically to the crusade of

⁷⁹ See de Negri, *Storia di Genova*, 455 ff. I find it surprising that some scholars have stated that Cantacuzenus knew about the second dogado of Boccalegro and that he describes accurately the cession of Genoa to Milan: Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 253. It is perfectly clear that Cantacuzenus is talking of a continuous dogado, from 1339 to 1353. I cannot find any mention of Boccalegro's second dogado which, in any case, began in 1356, when Cantacuzenus' *History* ends.

⁸⁰ Gregoras, I, 106–7.

⁸¹ Gregoras, III, 11 ff.

⁸² See, for example, Gregoras, I, 149 ff; II, 877 ff.

⁸³ Gregoras, III, 113 ff, 199, 511 ff. Cf. D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453* (London, 1971), 261 ff.

Smyrna, may refer to Edward III's 1346 campaign in France).⁸⁴ He does, of course, know about Spain; in fact, there is a fair amount about the politics of the house of Aragon. The islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily he not only mentions, but provides geographic descriptions of, at least for Sardinia and Sicily.⁸⁵

The two ends of the inhabited world, for Gregoras, are the lands inhabited by the Celts and the people who border the (western) ocean on the one hand, and on the other those inhabited by the Indians.⁸⁶ Thus, a good part of the “inhabited world” of the ancient and the enlightened medieval world makes an appearance, although sometimes a cameo one, on the pages of Gregoras. This is all quite unexceptional for the fourteenth century, when the knowledge of Ptolemaic geography was completed with rather elegant maps. The terminology, too, is ancient: the Germans (Alamanoi) are called ἐσπέριοι Γαλάται; the French are Keltogalatai; there is also Maurousia (Morocco).⁸⁷ The description of various lands derives from ancient knowledge. Thus, for example, in a brief discussion of the First Crusade, Gregoras takes pains to situate his reader in the appropriate place in western Europe: “There are, in Europe, very high mountains, called the Alps, from which a great River called the Rhine flows toward the British Ocean; it has to the south both Gallias” (μεσημβρινωτέρας ποιεῖ τὰς ἄμφω Γαλλίας). And he traces the route of the First Crusade, “from the Rhine down the Danube, a very great river which also springs from the Alps and comes out in the Black Sea, breaking up into five mouths.”⁸⁸ But there is a curious passage that contradicts all of this and plunges us back into the unreconstructed, i.e., western, Middle Ages. In the middle of one of his orations to Cantacuzenus, in 1351, Gregoras is arguing for φιλαλληλία, love of one another, as a sort of dialectic relationship between two people or sets of people, and also as a general law of nature: “This,” he says, “is what gives land a navigable sea and, on the other hand, gives passable land to the sea. That is how the Don, traversing its boundaries, flows out into Greece, and the Danube comes into Egypt, and the Nile communicates with the Sea of Azov.”⁸⁹ We are, now, in a different world, with a different geographic system from the one I have been describing—a world quite medieval, and with an allegorical significance.

Whatever the reasons may be for this excursion into a different geographic system, it is clear that Gregoras' world exists not only as a geographic unity, but also as a series of political or religious units. Part of it is held together by adherence to the Orthodox religion—from Rus to the Christian communities of Syria, Palestine, and Arabia. The European world and the world around the Mediterranean is sometimes seen to function as a unit, or form an entity. Thus, the Egyptian expansion in the late thirteenth century

⁸⁴Gregoras, II, 687 ff.

⁸⁵Gregoras, III, 190–92, for the description of Sardinia.

⁸⁶Gregoras, I, 332. Cf. III, 354, which gives the same diametrical opposition between East and West, between the Ethiopians and the Indians on the one hand and the Celts and the inhabitants of Britain on the other. The connection of Ethiopians and Indians is interesting; presumably this is *Ethiopia sub Aegypto*, and is used to designate eastern parts, not southern parts; the world, then, for him, would end somewhere around the Indus River.

⁸⁷Gregoras, I, 477. See also “Πατριβαλοῖ” for “Serbians”: II, 703.

⁸⁸Gregoras, I, 102–3.

⁸⁹Gregoras, II, 933: Καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ γῆ μὲν πλωτὴν ἐργάζεται θάλασσαν καὶ ταύτην αὐθις ἐκείνη βάσιμον· καὶ Τάναις μὲν δι' αὐτό τοι τοῦτο δρόμον ποιούμενος ὑπερόριον ἐπιρρέει τῇ Ἐλλάδι, καὶ Ἰστρος ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον ἐρχεται, καὶ Μαιώτιδι Νεῖλος κοινοῦται τὸ ρένμα.

is tied both to the Black Sea area, from which the Egyptians got their slaves, and to Africa and Asia, for with these Cuman slaves, says Gregoras, the Egyptians moved out of their frontiers, and expanded greatly, subjugating the Libyans and the Moroccans in the west, while in the east they took Arabia Felix and that part of Arabia which is defined by the Indian Ocean and, on either side, the Persian and the Arabian Gulf. Then they took Koile Syria and Phoenicia, bordered by the Orontes River.⁹⁰ What is detailed here owes something to Pachymeres—for example, the Black Sea connection, the very mention of the destruction of the crusader states—but the concept of a Christendom that is shaken by the Muslim counterattack, which we find in Pachymeres, is absent here; it is, rather, the political expansion of Egypt that is being described. Other parts of the inhabited world function as parts of a system: In the early 1340s, Gregoras finds the whole of Europe and north Africa in turmoil as though, he says, God had ordered that throughout the *oikoumene* both democracies and aristocracies should rebel and engage in civil wars, so that virtually no country was left untouched. First he mentions the Genoese expulsion of Boccanegra (1344), then the civil war in Egypt among the many sons of Sultan Muhammad bin Qalawun, who died in 1340. The inhabitants of Libya and Morocco “who live around the western Atlas mountains” attacked Spain, a correct reference for the year 1340. The English started a great war in France; the eastern Mongols dissolved into civil wars; and various Latins attacked the Turkish naval and piratical forces as well as Smyrna (October 1344).⁹¹

If this is his world, the Mediterranean lands are at its center, and it is about these that Gregoras provides the most extensive political if not geographic information; within this smaller circle, Italy occupies an important place for obvious reasons. Keeping away from the obvious, it is better to concentrate on the particularities of Gregoras’ presentation of Italy and Italian affairs. First of all, a note on geography and terminology. Gregoras uses the term “Italy” to refer almost exclusively to the kingdom of Naples, i.e., Pachymeres’ Apulia.⁹² Only in the discussion of religious matters are “Italy” and “Italians” sometimes used in the sense of Catholic.⁹³ The other parts of Italy are designated specifically, and often are given short descriptions. Lombardy is the other large province as far as Gregoras is concerned: Montferrat and Savoy are both presented as part of Lombardy.⁹⁴ In a curious passage, which aims to explain the various titles of Western rulers as having derived from titles held by imperial officials in the great days of the Roman Empire, he refers to Lombardy and Montferrat (which is unnamed) as though they were the same thing, and this “province” as having a ruler with the title of *markesios*.

⁹⁰Gregoras, I, 106 ff.

⁹¹Gregoras, II, 683–89. Ihor Ševčenko has pointed out that all this (except the Smyrna crusade) points to Genoese ships as transmitters of information; cf. I. Ševčenko, “The Zealot Revolution and the Supposed Genoese Colony in Thessalonica,” *Προσφορὰ εἰς Στίλπωνα Π. Κυριοκίδην* (Thessalonike, 1953), 611–12 (Ελληνικά 4, supp.). Stella mentions all this: RISS, 107SE, 1078D (Muslim attack on Spain); 1080C (Genoese vs. Golden Horde); 1087A (French-English war in Flanders).


⁹²See, for example, Gregoras, I, 123 ff, 193, 523; where the use might be generic, i.e., in the characterization of Barlaam as being from Italy, the reference turns out to be for the geographic area of the kingdom of Naples, i.e., Barlaam was from Calabria: Gregoras, I, 555; II, 901.

⁹³Gregoras, I, 501–20, on papal initiatives for church union in 1334.


⁹⁴Gregoras, I, 26, 383–84.



Map 1 The inhabited world according to Ptolemy. Codex Urbinas graecus 82, fols. 59v–60r (photo: courtesy of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana)



Map 2 Danube and the Danube River according to Ptolemy. Codex Urbinus græcus 82, fol. 76v-77r
(photo: courtesy of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana)



Map 3 Sardinia and Sicily according to Ptolemy. Codex Urbinus 82, fols. 72v–73r (photo: courtesy of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana)

He places it “somewhere between the Alps and lower Iberia,” and says it is small and insignificant.⁹⁵ Milan he does not specifically situate in Lombardy, but he does give a geographic description of it on the occasion of the surrender of Genoa to Giovanni Visconti, in 1353. Milan is an old city, placed in the middle of the Alps, and surrounded by mountains on all sides so that it is impregnable.⁹⁶

Sicily, too, appears in Gregoras’ history, primarily because of Manfred, and thus, through Pachymeres, and merits a geographic description: it is a large and populous island, whose distance from Scyllaeum, the Italian promontory, to Messina is no more than 30 *milia*.⁹⁷ Sardinia comes in for a description, because of the role it played in the later stages of the War of the Straits. “There is a large and populous island lying in the Tyrrhenian Sea, which has long mountains and a number of rivers, and many cities, both on the coast and in the interior. All around there are coasts and harbors and gulfs.”⁹⁸ To round off the discussion of Italy, it is perhaps worth noting that the geography of the area is effortlessly used as a reference—for example, to make an argument by analogy. In trying to argue that one should judge men’s virtue by their intention and not by their final actions, Gregoras produces the analogy that this is similar to what would happen if someone started from Sicily and wanted to sail to the ports of Sardinia and Corsica (due west), but a violent western wind pushed him to Crete. The analogy is never completed, but he presumably means that the observer should keep in mind the original intent, not the final and accidental end of the journey.⁹⁹

Italy then is a very familiar place, but still one that merits description, not unlike Cyprus, Rhodes, or Crete in other instances: a place that is important to know, foreign enough for geographic description, but not sufficiently foreign for ethnographic description (not that Gregoras is much given to that). In any case, similarly, he finds it necessary—or perhaps just fun, and a way to show off—to provide the translation of important terms. Specifically, he gives us the Greek equivalents of the terms for the most important officials of the Italian colonies in Constantinople: the *baile*, he says, is an “*epitropos*,” the Pisan consul an “*ephoros*,” and the Genoese *podestà* an “*exousiastes*.¹⁰⁰

In terms of political importance, it is, of course, Venice and Genoa that retain pride of place, with Genoa far outdistancing Venice. Gregoras has an interest in the internal affairs of these places, and, most particularly, in their colonial policies. His knowledge of the internal affairs of Genoa is actually quite impressive.¹⁰¹ The tumultuous events of Genoese history are presented, quite correctly from a fourteenth-century observer’s point of view, as a long struggle between Guelphs and Ghibellines. The first mention of this struggle is preceded, in a typical manner, by a brief positioning of Genoa on the map: “Genoa is a maritime Italian city in the West, lying between the Alps and the

⁹⁵ Gregoras, I, 237. But cf. I, 13, where he names the marquis of Montferrat who became king of Thessalonica, and I, 167–68, where Irene of Montferrat is identified as a descendant of that first marquis of Montferrat, even though Montferrat is not expressly named.

⁹⁶ Gregoras, III, 193.

⁹⁷ Gregoras, I, 217.

⁹⁸ Gregoras, III, 190.

⁹⁹ Gregoras, II, 589.

¹⁰⁰ Gregoras, I, 97–98; cf. I, 268, on the Genoese *podestà*.

¹⁰¹ Here I differ with Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 253, and “Genova,” 488, who finds that Gregoras’ discussion of Genoese affairs simply falls within his preconceived ideas of democracy and tyranny.

Tyrrhenian sea.”¹⁰² It was inhabited, he says, by two γένη, families or factions, the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. He mentions the unseating and exile of the Ghibellines in the early 1320s, and the fact that the unrest spread to the Genoese colonies, which the exiles attacked with mercenary forces. The confusion of the late 1330s and early 1340s is telescoped: He talks of the rise in power of Simone Boccanegra, who is called by the title “touzos,” i.e., doge, without details, saying simply that he was raised from a butcher to doge. The reason for that rebellion had been that the nobles (he mentions Spinola and “Sertorio,” i.e., D’Oria) had been behaving in a tyrannical manner; they were therefore exiled. Later, they were allowed back into the city; they formed a conspiracy against Boccanegra, and soon began to behave like tyrants again. The people then rose against them once again, and exiled them from the city, electing another doge who also sprang from a lowly class.¹⁰³ This is quite accurate. He also has a circumstantial description of the battle of Alghero, longer than Stella’s and more detailed.¹⁰⁴

On the other hand, Gregoras is quite wrong in his description of the composition of the mahona of Chios. He confuses the original aim of the mahona—opposition to the exiles of Monaco—with the participants of the mahona, and says, wrongly, that the mahona was made up of Genoese exiles. Cantacuzenus is much more accurate in this respect.¹⁰⁵ Equally, his discussion of the effect of the War of the Straits on Genoese internal affairs is exiguous. Whereas he gives a proper explanation of the participation of the “Catalans,” that is, of the king of Aragon, against the Genoese (Genoa had taken a part of Sardinia, which belonged to Aragon), he has very little to say of the fate of Pagano Doria, so much bemoaned by Cantacuzenus. He simply says that the Genoese feared lest they be conquered by Venice, there was civil disorder, and “in a short time they overturned the ancient institutions of their Republic,” and gave themselves up to Milan. The overlordship of Milan he considers to have been divine punishment for Genoa’s arrogance and faithlessness, and most particularly for the way it had behaved toward the Byzantines. A true case of *hubris* is presented here: having dreamt of the mastery of all the seas, from Tana and the Sea of Azov to Gadeira and the Heracleian columns, the Genoese even lost their own country; having unjustly appropriated common property, they justly lost even what belonged to them (τὸ κοινὸν ἀδίκως ἰδιοποιούμενοι, ἔλαθον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐνδίκως . . . ἀπολωλεκότες).¹⁰⁶

This brings us to the most interesting part of Gregoras’ treatment of the Italians. His most insightful moments—which, one must admit, are not many—come when he discusses the commercial and colonial policy of the Italians, especially the Genoese, and, to a lesser extent, the Venetians. The establishment of Genoese power he attributes, unsur-

¹⁰² Gregoras, I, 286.

¹⁰³ “Touzos” must be a transliteration of the Genoese “dūxe.” Gregoras, I, 286–87; I, 548: they elected ἡγεμόνα τῆς πολιτείας ἔνα τοῦ δῆμου, κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ὑπατείας τὸν Πῶμασίων ἀξίωμα, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν τῶν Βενετικῶν πολιτείαν (1339). Cf. II, 687–88, and Origone, *Bisanzio e Genova*, 253. In fact, Giovanni di Murta, who succeeded Boccanegra, was a noble, but a moderate man; and there was, also, a rebellion, which made the council a preserve of the popular class.

¹⁰⁴ Gregoras, III, 190 ff. Cf. Stella, RISS, 152.

¹⁰⁵ Gregoras, II, 765–66, and cf. Cantacuzenus, II, 583; cf. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, 122–24.

¹⁰⁶ Gregoras, III, 193–94. Actually this is fairly close to Stella’s explanation of the cession of Genoa to Milan; he attributes it to the fear of an explosion of civil conflict: RISS, 152.

prisingly, to the privileges granted by Michael VIII.¹⁰⁷ But as far as the increase in their power is concerned, his analysis is almost subtle, or in any case subtler than that of Cantacuzenus. He attributes it in part to the decline of the Byzantine navy, and to the service of Byzantine sailors on Genoese ships; he attributes it, too, to the incessant civil wars of the Byzantines, and to the fact that their rulers paid no attention to the political or economic affairs of the state, while the Genoese of Pera, on the other hand, gave close attention to such matters. As a result, he says in a well-known passage, the Genoese expected to have the mastery of these seas, took over not only the commercial wealth but also the money collected from commercial duties, and opposed any effort of the Byzantines to sail and trade in the Black Sea.¹⁰⁸

Virtually his whole discussion of the Genoese in the Levant revolves around the idea that they wanted "thalassocracy"—by which he means essentially mastery of the northern Aegean and the Black Sea. And it is he who provides the classic model of Genoese expansion in these parts in another well-known passage that discusses the origins of their colony in Caffa and their relations with the Mongols, down to the war of 1343 and the expulsion of the Genoese. There are enough parallels between the concepts in this passage and in two passages in Pachymeres to suggest that Gregoras acquired his understanding of Genoese commercial and colonial policy from that older and much better historian.¹⁰⁹ However, he does contribute his own observations, from his own time, such as his understanding of the international aspect of the grain trade, and of the effects of the expulsion of the Genoese from Caffa both on that area and on their compatriots in Trebizond. He understands, too, that the War of the Straits was an all-out war between Venice and Genoa, fought all over the Mediterranean, although he does not seem to understand why.¹¹⁰ He understands the mechanics of it, however, and sees it as a war between two powers with colonies, in which the colonies (including Crete) participate fully in the hostilities.¹¹¹ He also understands something of Venice's way of doing business. He reports that the Venetians try to buy peace, which is essential for the conduct of trade, from which they garner great profits; they go to war only when they are forced to, and then they buy off their neighbors and others, make them into allies, and even get armies from them.¹¹²

It is time to look at our three historians together. Between the time of Pachymeres and that of Gregoras and Cantacuzenus, a period of almost fifty years, great changes had taken place. As far as our topic is concerned, two of these changes are of importance: the loss of Asia Minor to the Turks and the firm establishment of the Genoese presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in a supremacy that was already greatly disputed at the time the histories of Gregoras and Cantacuzenus were written. As a result of these developments, the relative weight of Italy and the Italians increased, as one may

¹⁰⁷ Gregoras, I, 526–27.

¹⁰⁸ Gregoras, I, 526–27; II, 841–45.

¹⁰⁹ Gregoras, II, 683–87, and Failler, 535; Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 448–50.

¹¹⁰ Gregoras, II, 880.

¹¹¹ See, e.g., Gregoras, III, 39.

¹¹² Gregoras, III, 189–90. It should be noted that he also mentions very briefly the efforts toward an anti-Turkish league, spearheaded by Venice: I, 525; cf. A. E. Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: The Background to the Anti-Turkish League of 1332–34," *Speculum* 45 (1970), 374–92.

see in the accounts of the two later historians. Their knowledge of Italian affairs may not be greater than that of Pachymeres, but it lies closer to the surface. At the same time, in terms of analysis, Pachymeres is exceptional, for he understood the causes and eventual effects of Genoese supremacy, and Gregoras is at his best when he follows in the steps of this analysis. If Pachymeres was still very much writing within the atmosphere created by 1204 and then by the Union of Lyons, and thus used a terminology that defined the Italians in religious terms, he was also a man who had a concept of the Mediterranean and the complex interrelationships of politics in that basin. His successors had much closer contact with the Italians; they counted some among their friends, they used terminology that reflects their knowledge of both the institutions and, to some degree, the language of Italy. All of this is attended by more detailed discussion of geography (in the case of Gregoras) and more detailed attention to the internal politics and policies of Italian states by both. Italy and the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean are very much at center stage by the middle of the fourteenth century.

The role of the Italians as perceived by our three historians may be seen in their discussion of the effects of the dissolution of the Byzantine navy in 1285. Pachymeres describes at length and bitterly the counsel of those who urged the dissolution of the expensive fleet on the illusion that it was not needed since the Venetians and the Genoese were newly at peace, and Charles of Anjou had no power anymore (he died in 1285). He laments the decision, for he sees the impossibility of preserving the security of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople, and the islands without a navy, especially since the Italians were eager to recapture Constantinople. He notes the fact that some of the sailors became pirates, and the unpleasant effects of that development. He then shows how that action made hostilities on the part of the Venetians possible, in 1302, and how, at the time of the Catalan campaign, Andronicus II was bitterly berated by the people at Constantinople, who said that they never would be secure without a fleet.¹¹³ Cantacuzenus mentions the fleet, yes, but primarily to attack the merchants of Constantinople for not having given him the money he wanted to build a fleet until it was almost too late and the Genoese were causing trouble: a case, once again, of Cantacuzenus' mistreatment by the people of Constantinople. Note also that here the effects of the destruction of the fleet have shrunk, to the defense of the city itself.¹¹⁴ Gregoras returns to Pachymeres' analysis and makes the destruction of the fleet a major step in the decline of the Byzantine Empire: he can now add to Pachymeres' fear of Italian attacks by sea the fear and reality of Turkish piratical expeditions and Turkish armies arriving in Europe on Turkish ships without the Byzantines being able to do much about it.¹¹⁵ He can also expand, as we have already noted, on the many and multiple effects of the quest of the Genoese for mastery of the seas. Interestingly, one of the remedies the Byzantines took, in 1343, he describes in terms that Cantacuzenus clearly and Gregoras less clearly had used for an Italian—a Genoese—action: when the rich people of Constantinople, in 1348, became persuaded of the need to build a fleet, “they built and armed men-of-war and small ships at their own expense” (λέμβους στρατιώτιδας καὶ ἀκάτια συνεσκευάσαντο τε καὶ ἐξώπλισαν ἐξ

¹¹³ Pachymeres, (Bonn), II, 69–71, 322–24, 530–33. Cf. Laiou, *Constantinople*, 74–75, 110, 114–15.

¹¹⁴ Cantacuzenus, III, 68 ff, and to the same effect Gregoras, II, 854 ff.

¹¹⁵ Gregoras, I, 174–76, 208–9, 841 ff, 866–67. “The Latins would not have grown so arrogant toward the Romans, nor would the Turks ever have gazed upon the sands of the sea . . .”: Laiou, *Constantinople*, 115.

οίκειας δαπάνης).¹¹⁶ The words “έξ οίκειας δαπάνης” are the exact equivalent of Cantacuzenus’ words—“οίκειοις ἀναλόμασι”—with which he describes the arming of the manhona, the fleet of Vignoso that took Chios.¹¹⁷ Thus, our Byzantine historians saw similarities even in institutions that were rather particular to, in this case, Genoa.

As Constantinople became the center of a vanishing state, in the mid-fourteenth century, interest in Italy and the Italians increased, for the very fate of the city seemed to depend on them. The broad interest in Italy is a measure of the weakness of the Byzantines and a measure of the colonization of the old Byzantine Empire; to put it euphemistically, it is a measure of the inclusion of Byzantium into a broader Mediterranean world whose center of gravity was in Italy, and whose motor was the policies of the great Italian maritime republics. It was an unequal world; the ties that bound Byzantines and Italians did not bind them with equal force.

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¹¹⁶Gregoras, II, 857.

¹¹⁷Cantacuzenus, II, 583.